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Hospital Employment and Local Unemployment:  
Evidence from French Health Reforms 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The scope for public intervention in markets is discussed all over the world (Le Grand 
and Bartlett 1993). Even after the large-scale privatisation undertaken in many European 
countries during the 1980s and 1990s, the public sector continues to represent a significant 
share (15-20%) of employment in most industrialised countries (Melly and Puhani, 2011). We 
here consider public-sector employment, from 2006-2010 panel data on the universe of 
French hospitals, and ask how this is related to local unemployment. We are able to exploit 
two features of French hospitals to identify a particular relationship between public-sector 
employment and local unemployment. First, there are three different hospital types: For-
Profit, Not-For-Profit, and Public hospitals. Second, we appeal to a pro-competitive reform 
that was introduced for all hospitals in 2008. 
Health and education are widely-provided by the public sector in many countries. 
However, the exact definition of what “public” means in terms of employment is not fixed 
and has changed over time. In European countries, the status of employees working in the 
public sector has changed from being civil servants to long-term contract employees. In 
particular, in Scandinavian countries this applies to the first years of teaching and research 
activities in the University and a growing number of health positions; in the UK, in hospitals 
with managerial autonomy many new employees are not civil servants. As a concrete 
example, the merger of two publicly-funded University hospitals in Stockholm, Sweden was 
managed by a Director hired under a private-contract, who had previously held senior 
management positions in private industry. The aim of this merger was to obtain a more 
efficient hospital with a balanced budget without reducing healthcare quality. This 
hybridisation of hospital staff types and the focus on economic efficiency has not come 
without conflict. In this particular case, protests escalated from clinical staff, and Division 
Heads began to seriously question the focus on economic efficiency and their Director’s 
approach to running the hospital like a private company (Choi et al., 2011). This does 
however seem to be a global tendency in European countries, where historically publicly-
owned hospitals have switched to being privately-run. A number of recent papers have 
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developed a method to quantify management practices in order to measure managerial quality 
across different firms (Jacobs et al., 2006; Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007; Bloom et al., 2010). 
Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) suggest that poor management practices are more prevalent in 
firms that are faced with weaker product-market competition. 
The public sector has also evolved in France, and we here consider developments in the 
health sector. State-owned hospitals are run by a Director, who can now be recruited 
according to their CV, whereas a diploma from a specific school (l'École des Hautes Etudes 
en Santé Publique) was previously a prerequisite for a hospital Director appointment. With 
the managerial reform that was introduced as part of the HPST Law of July 21st 2009 (which 
came into force starting in 2010), the role of the hospital Director has changed to that of a 
manager, reflecting the shift of State-owned hospitals towards private-sector firms. This Law 
also restricted any potential links between public hospital employment and local political 
influence. The reform put an end to the rule that the local mayor systematically be the 
president of the establishment’s Board of Directors; this latter has been replaced by an 
Advisory Board, the president of which, elected by the Board’s members, may be a local 
politician but also some other competent person. 
Somewhat earlier, the gradual introduction of the DRG-basis hospital-reimbursement 
reform
1
 over 2004-2008 (called T2A in France) introduced competition across hospitals as an 
incentive for greater efficiency. In previous work on cross-section data from 1999 (Clark and 
Milcent, 2011), we found that public hospitals employ more staff than do non-public 
hospitals, conditional on size and the illnesses treated; we also found that this employment 
gap was systematically correlated with local unemployment. Our data here cover the universe 
of hospitals over the 2006-2010 period, which includes the full implementation of the DRG-
basis payment-system reform in 2008 (but is almost entirely prior to the roll-out of the HPST 
reform). The question we ask is then whether the DRG reform has broken the link between 
State-owned hospital employment and the local unemployment rate. The introduction of this 
reform coincided with the 2008 financial crisis. It is also possible that this exogenous labour-
market shock provided local political authorities with an additional incentive to use public-
sector employment as a tool to mop up part of the associated rise in unemployment.  
                                                 
1
 Each hospital stay is associated with a Diagnosis-Related Group (DRG) , and each DRG is allocated a ‘weight’ depending 
on the average cost of the inputs (e.g. nursing, diagnostic services, procedures) required to achieve the appropriate patient 
outcome. The DRGs divide hospital cases (patients) up into around 700 groups, which contain similar pathologies requiring 
similar levels of hospital resource use. In a certain number of these pathology groups, patients are classified by four levels of 
severity (exploratory procedures are not categorised in this way). These DRGs and their weights differ from one country to 
another. There are around 2,200 French DRGs. 
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We use a fixed-effect model in panel data to control for hospital heterogeneity, and 
consider employment changes within-hospital. We compare the hospital employment to local 
unemployment relationship before and after the introduction of the pro-competition hospital 
reform. Our main result is that rising local unemployment is associated with greater 
employment in State-owned hospitals, but not in other hospitals. It was assumed that the 
introduction of the 2008 competitive reimbursement reform would reduce State-owned 
hospital employment: this is indeed what we find. However we also see that this reform had 
no overall effect on the relationship between State-owned hospital employment and local 
unemployment, although the exact details depend on local deprivation. In less-deprived areas, 
the reform worked as expected, with lower hospital employment and no correlation between 
local unemployment and State-owned hospital employment; however, in higher-
unemployment areas, the former continues to hold but public hospital employment continues 
to be counter-cyclical. 
The paper contributes to a growing literature on the effect of the political environment on 
secondary policy issues. Such secondary policy issues are defined as substantially affecting 
only small groups in society, typical examples being environmental policy, gun control, 
foreign aid, trade policy and unemployment policy. List and Sturm (2006) explore the extent 
to which such secondary policy issues are influenced by electoral incentives. They find that, 
in contrast to the popular view that secondary policies are largely determined by lobbying, 
electoral incentives have strong effects. Bloom et al. (2015) exploit political concerns over 
one particular policy, healthcare provision. They use the share of marginal political 
constituencies around each hospital as an instrument for the number of nearby competing 
hospitals. Politicians in the UK almost never allow hospitals in politically-marginal 
constituencies to close down, which produces greater hospital competition in areas with more 
marginal constituencies. Lizzeri and Persico (2001), Miles-Ferretti et al. (2002) and Persson 
and Tabellini (1999), compare majoritarian and proportional elections, and find that they lead 
to different levels and composition of public expenditure (which is due to different groups 
being targeted). We here consider the specific role of the local political authority in the 
employment policy of State-owned hospitals. 
Our paper is also closely related to the literature on healthcare providers (Brekke et al., 
2011, Chalkley and Malcomson, 2000, Ellis and McGuire, 1986, and Mougeot and Naegelen, 
2008). One strand of this literature has focused on competition in healthcare 
(Gowrisankararan and Town, 2003, Propper, 2008, Shortell and Hughes, 1988, and Volpp and 
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Waldfogel, 2001). In recent years, policymakers in many countries have experimented with 
various ways of increasing the effective competition in healthcare in order to increase 
productivity. A mainly US literature has suggested that under certain conditions (regulated 
prices and observable quality) competition may improve quality (Kessler and McClellan, 
2000) even if the consensus in the literature is not total. The effect of competition on 
mortality is likely to depend on the reimbursement rate (Shen, 2003). If hospitals are 
underpaid for patients with a given insurance, such as Medicare patients, they have little or no 
incentive to compete for them by improving quality. In the UK recent pro-competitive 
hospital reforms appear to have increased quality (Cooper et al., 2011, and Gaynor et al., 
2013). Competition, by itself, has been shown to result in better hospital management (Bloom 
et al., 2015).  
Our work is particularly pertinent to the debate over the use of competition as a means of 
improving hospital productivity. It underlines the potential presence of other factors that may 
distort the link between competition and hospital productivity, independently of hospital 
efficiency.  
Last, our paper contributes to the debate over publicly-regulated versus private markets. 
There has been a great deal of interest in recent years in competition in education, both 
theoretically and empirically (Epple et al., 2004, and Hoxby, 2000). The initial findings in 
this field were in favour of competition in education, although this conclusion has become 
more mitigated in recent work according to the context (Bayer and McMillan, 2005, and 
Rothstein, 2007).  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explains the French 
context and the reform that took place up to 2008. The data are described in Section 3, and 
Section 4 presents the empirical results. Last, Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. French hospital types and the introduction of competition 
 
2.1 The French hospital system 
In this paper, the term “hospitals” refers to all healthcare establishments with an acute 
care unit. As in many countries, France has both private- and public-sector hospitals. There 
are two broad types of the former, according to whether they are not-for-profit or for-profit. 
We shall refer to these three types as NFP, private and public, for simplicity. All of these 
three hospital types have a non-negligible share of the French healthcare market. As a rough 
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guide, considered in terms of full-time equivalent employees in the current data for the 2006-
2010 period, public hospitals account for just over 80 per cent of this sector, with the 
corresponding figures for NFP and private being 6 and 12 per cent respectively. 
The French National Health Insurance (the Sécurité Sociale) is a single-payer system: this 
eliminates any concerns about potential cost-shifting behaviour by providers, negotiation 
between providers and payers, or different reimbursement schemes for different patients. The 
reimbursements cover almost all medical services in hospital, except the additional fixed fee 
per day for catering and accommodation claimed by for-profit hospitals. 
The difference between hospital types revolves around the selection of patients, hospital 
management, and way in hospitals are reimbursed for their activities by the Sécurité Sociale. 
We here consider the first two of these, and then turn to hospital reimbursement in Section 2.2 
below.  
The first difference is that private for-profit hospitals can choose who they treat; neither 
public nor NFP hospitals can select their patients. In terms of hospital management, staff 
status is similar in private and NFP hospitals, where staff are either self-employed (mainly the 
Doctors), salaried with a long-term contract, or salaried under a variety of short-term 
contracts.
2
 On the contrary, public-hospital employees are either civil servants (which 
workers are very difficult to fire) or employed under the same variety of short-term contracts 
as above. These short-term contracts are restrictive in terms of the number of times they can 
be renewed; they in practice cover mainly lower-skilled workers. The government’s aim here 
is to encourage establishments to transform these short-term contracts into long-term 
employment contracts in NFP and private hospitals, and into permanent civil service jobs in 
State-owned hospitals. 
Public-hospital employment is determined by the hospital's Board of Directors, which 
latter includes local government representatives, and in particular the Mayor. The 
management of these hospitals is quite bureaucratic, with decisions following administrative 
procedures. Following a reform in 2005, public hospitals are supposed to have an Executive 
Council to improve the communication of decisions between the administrative and medical 
staff, including those relating to employment. The hospital's Board of Directors continues 
however to play the decisive role. It is important in the context of our paper to note that the 
Boards of Directors of private and NFP hospitals include neither local government 
representatives nor the Mayor, and decisions are more likely to be made jointly by the 
                                                 
2
These different contracts were introduced successively by the government to try to reduce unemployment. They include the 
contrat nouvelle embauche (CNE) of 2005 and the four main types of contrats aidés between 2005 and 2009. 
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medical and administrative staff. Public hospitals had only little interest in attracting patients 
until the introduction of the reimbursement reform (2004-2008). 
The particularity of the French system is therefore the presence of a particular type of 
private hospital: NFP hospitals which are managed like for-profit private hospitals but which 
are regulated (particularly in terms of not being able to turn patients away) like public 
hospitals.  
In addition to the way in which they are run, the hospital reimbursement schemes are not 
the same across the three hospital types, and it is this that the authorities have sought to 
change via the introduction of more competition. 
 
2.2 Hospital reimbursement and the introduction of competition 
Reimbursement of hospitals in France depends only on hospital type and the illnesses 
treated. Hospital reimbursement progressively changed over the 2004-2008 period.  
Prior to 2004, Public and NFP hospitals received a global budget, which was historically-
determined and did not reflect hospital activity. Starting in 2004, a Payment-Per-Service 
system (widely known in the US as a Prospective Payment System - PPS) was progressively 
implemented in both NFP and public hospitals. In the PPS, the portion of these hospitals’ 
budgets reflecting actual (previous year) activity as measured by French-DRGs rose over time 
from zero in 2003 to 10% in 2004, 25% in 2005, 35% in 2006, 50% in 2007 and 100% in 
2008. 
Private hospitals have always been paid on a fee-for-service basis. This fee differed from 
one region to another. With the reimbursement reform, private hospitals switched in 2005 
from being paid by act to being paid according to the French-DRG. Figure 1 proposes a 
timeline showing the changes in the reimbursement scheme for  different hospital types, and 
the hospital management reforms described above, as well as the period over which we 
observe hospitals. 
The reimbursement scheme for all French hospitals can therefore now be summarised as 
follows.  
 
• F is the total budget for all hospital activity, as voted by Parliament. 
• The total number of French-DRG points in hospital i (French-DRGi) is the weighted 
sum (also known as the cost weight) of all the activities that were carried out in the 
hospital in the previous year. 
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• The value of the point, v (which determines hospital reimbursement) is F/(sum of 
French-DRGi over all hospitals). This calculation of v ensures that the budget F is 
exactly spent. 
• The reimbursement of hospital i is then given by French-DRGi*v. 
 
So if a hospital carries out more activities (via care or surgery, for example) it will earn 
more as its DRG score will be higher; however, other hospitals will earn less as the value of 
the point falls.  
The reimbursement is therefore now the same between all hospital types. The only 
difference between the sectors is the number of DRG points which are assigned to a particular 
intervention or care activity, which may be higher or lower in private compared to public or 
NFP hospitals. The system therefore now resembles a zero-sum game, where each hospital 
has an incentive to try to outdo the others. A hospital that maintains the same activity from 
year to year, while other hospitals increase theirs, will see its budget diminish over time. In 
addition, the abolition of the global budget for public and NFP hospitals ties their budget far 
more closely to their current activity, providing an incentive to attract patients. 
 
2.3 Hospital employment and the labour market 
Our previous work using 1999 cross-section administrative data showed that hospital 
employment in France is consistently higher in public hospitals than in NFP or private 
hospitals (Clark and Milcent, 2011). This holds even controlling for a number of measures of 
hospital output, such as the cost weight. By matching in local labour-market information, we 
were able to show that public-hospital employment was strongly positively correlated with the 
local unemployment rate. However, no such relationship was found in other hospitals. We 
concluded that our results were consistent with public hospitals providing employment in 
depressed areas.  
The key potential issue with our 2011 results was that of unobserved heterogeneity. 
Hospitals employ more or fewer staff than each other because they do different things. Our 
cross-section results included controls for the number of beds, the number of patients, and the 
hospital cost weight. However, even with this detailed information on what hospitals do, we 
can always worry about omitted variables that are correlated with public-hospital activity and 
the local unemployment rate (which latter we cannot instrument successfully). One potential 
example might be local-area deprivation, the health effects of which are mainly felt in public 
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hospitals (and in a way that is not picked up by number of patients and cost weight). More 
generally, patient type and hospital type may be correlated in an unobserved way. For 
example, public hospitals may admit more low-income patients who require more low-skilled 
staff to follow-up after medical procedures, for a given pathology and level of severity. 
In the current paper we have panel data, so that we can look at the relationship of hospital 
employment to local unemployment within the same hospital over time. As such, we avoid 
any problem of confounding unobserved time-invariant hospital characteristics: all of our 
results come from comparing the same hospital in different years. 
In addition to this statistical advantage of panel data in factoring out unobservables, the 
main thrust of our paper is to exactly follow the introduction of competition between hospitals 
described in Section 2.1 above. One hypothesis is then that (relative to private hospitals, for 
which payment schemes have remained unchanged since 2005) public hospitals will have 
become progressively less reactive to local labour-market unemployment as competition rose 
between 2004 and 2008. We thus ask whether the different hospital types now look more 
similar to each other, in staffing terms. In other words, we should observe no correlation 
between local unemployment and hospital employment, whatever the hospital type. 
Furthermore, assuming that employment was “too high” in State-owned hospitals, as 
compared to the others, we should observe falling employment there over this period, and in 
particularly over the 2006-2008 period when the policy was being implemented. 
In terms of the unemployment rate, this period was marked by the financial crisis, which 
began in 2008 with the Lehman scandal and the crash of the housing-market bubble. In the 
following period economic activity in the U.S. and many other countries declined 
significantly, with an associated rise in unemployment. In France, unemployment fell from 
2006 to 2008 (from around 9% to 7.5%), but then rose to 9.1% in 2009 and 9.3% in 2010. 
This financial crisis coincided with the hospital-reimbursement reform (T2A) for NFP and 
State-owned hospitals. We may then think that the role of public hospitals in preserving 
employment became more salient during this period: we may then see a greater correlation 
between unemployment and hospital employment as the financial crisis unfolded. 
The analysis of hospital staffing and local unemployment, across different hospital types, 
over this period will thus provide the econometric answer to this question. These results are 
presented below in Section 4. Before we do so, Section 3 describes the data used in our 
analysis. 
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3. Data 
Our administrative data comes from the 2006-2010 SAE (Statistiques Annuelles des 
Etablissements) survey, which collects information on hospital staff and activities. We match 
in local-area information on the communal age distribution, unemployment and nationality 
from the 2006-2010 French Census. The unemployment rate used here is the unemployment 
rate in the municipality in which the hospital is situated. The data covers the universe of 
French hospitals. 
The SAE includes information on hospital size (the number of beds and the number of 
annual admissions), and the type of care that is provided to patients. It also provides 
information on the number of staff in five different professional categories: administrative 
staff, support staff, medical staff, paramedical staff and Doctors. The support staff generally 
consists of unqualified workers, such as those working on buildings and grounds. Paramedical 
staff covers, for example, those providing social assistance to patients. This includes qualified 
and unqualified staff such as psychologists, physical therapists and dieticians and social 
service workers. The medical staff consists of Nurses (including Specialised Nurses) and 
nursing auxiliary staff. These five staffing groups differ notably by qualification level: the 
support staff being the least-qualified, and Doctors the highest-qualified. Nursing, 
paramedical staff and administrative staff include both qualified and unqualified workers. For 
example, some of the nursing auxiliaries do not have professional training (namely the ASH: 
“agent de service hospitalier”). 
The number of administrative, support and (salaried) medical staff in each hospital are 
calculated from readily-available information on hours worked to produce full-time 
equivalent figures. This figure is comparable between the three hospital types. The situation is 
less clear for Doctors, who are civil servants in public hospitals but are private-sector salaried 
or self-employed (profession libérale) in both NFP and private hospitals. In the latter, many 
Doctors are self-employed and are associated with a patient rather than a specific number of 
hours in the hospital. Calculating full-time equivalent figures for Doctors is not obvious. As 
Clark and Milcent (2011) show using cross-section data from the 1999 SAE, the number of 
Doctors employed in hospitals does not seem to be related to the local unemployment rate 
(conditional on the other explanatory variables), whatever the type of hospital ownership. 
Therefore, for the sake of simplicity, we do not do focus on this category of hospital staff 
here.  
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Our panel data allow us to control for all time-invariant heterogeneity between hospitals. 
However, the types of activity that hospitals carry out may potentially change over this five-
year period, and help explain the change in employment in both State-owned and private (FP 
and NFP) hospitals: some of the jobs in all hospital types are short-term contracts, making 
employment fairly easy to adjust both upwards and downwards. We formally control for 
hospital activity via the cost weight, from hospital administrative records. Each hospital stay 
is associated with a Diagnosis-Related Group (DRG),
3
 and each DRG is allocated a ‘weight’ 
depending on the average cost of the inputs (e.g. nursing, diagnostic services, procedures) 
required to achieve the appropriate patient outcome. The hospital cost weight is the sum of all 
the DRGs of the stays in the hospital over the year.
4
 This index was first used in US; it is now 
also used in France where it is called the ISA (“indice synthétique d’activité”). One drawback 
of using hospital cost-weight data is that some observations are lost in the subsequent merge. 
We systematically check that our results are robust to the omission of the cost-weight 
variable. Our analysis below will also control for illness severity (as measured by the severity 
level of each DRG) and a number of local population characteristics (at the municipality 
level).
5
 
Table 1 shows the mean number of hospitals observed per year, over our five-year period. 
These figures refer to the universe of French hospitals. Table 1 shows that hospitals are split 
roughly 50:50 between public and non-public status. Amongst the latter, just over 20% are 
NFP, while the rest are private. The standard deviations in column 2 are only small, as 
perhaps might be expected: the number of hospitals changes only little over time. These 
changes come about via new hospitals opening, existing ones shutting down, or mergers 
between units. In fact, it is the latter that has predominated. Table A2 in the Appendix shows 
that the total number of hospitals (and indeed the number of each type of hospital) has fallen 
monotonically over the period under consideration. There are 125 fewer hospitals in 2010 
than in 2006, representing a fall of 7%.  
Table 1 also presents hospital staffing levels. Public hospitals employ more staff than do 
private hospitals (not-for profit or for-profit). One natural explanation could be the hospital 
                                                 
3
The DRG divides hospital cases (patients) up into around 700 groups, which contain similar pathologies 
requiring similar levels of hospital resource use. In a certain number of these pathology groups, patients are 
classified by four levels of severity (exploratory procedures are not categorised in this way). There are around 
2,200 French DRGs. 
4
We should keep in mind that the cost-weight here reflects differences in “what hospitals do” within the hospital 
over the time period. Any average difference between hospitals in “what hospitals do” regarding type of 
treatment is already captured by the hospital fixed effects. 
5
The descriptive statistics of all of the variables used in the analysis appear in Table A1. 
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size. As is well-known, public hospitals are on average much larger than other hospitals, with 
just over 750 employees per hospital, as opposed to under 300 in NFP hospitals and just over 
160 in private hospitals. Large research and teaching health establishments are by regulation 
public-sector in France. This larger average figure in the public sector does however mask a 
great disparity in the size of public hospitals. There are both many large public hospitals 
(including three agglomerated hospitals at the city level),
6
 and at the same time a considerable 
number of small public hospitals. Considering as “small” hospitals with fewer than 75 
employees, we find that 29% of private hospitals and 20% of NFP hospitals are small, but 
equally 23% of public hospitals. 
We split hospitals up into four categories according to the number of admissions ((up to 5 
000, 5 000-10 000, 10 000-16 000, and over 16 000), which are the size cut-points used by the 
French Ministry of Health in their hospital comparisons. Table A3 shows that all public 
research and teaching hospitals have over 16 000 admissions. As expected, total employment 
increases in the number of admissions. However, the rise in total employment with the 
number of admissions is steeper in State-owned than private hospitals.
7
 Similar results pertain 
if we use the number of beds as the measure of hospital size. Even within size-class, Public-
sector hospitals employ more workers than do their non-public counterparts, on average over 
the period (and by year). 
The detailed structure of staff differs by hospital type, on average over the 2006-2010 
period. Unqualified staff (namely support staff) represent 13% of employment in State-owned 
hospitals but between 8 and 6% in private hospitals (not-for-profit and for-profit).On the other 
hand, nurses represent 28% of State-owned hospital staff but 34% of staff in for-profit 
hospitals. 
Figure 2 shows how hospital employment has changed over time. Here there is at first 
sight no evidence of any structural break in the employment series, which rise gradually over 
time. In particular, public hospital employment grew over the 2006-2010 period (by 8.5%). 
But so did employment in NFP and private hospitals (by 14.4% and 12% respectively). This 
might be thought to indicate some effect of the competitive reforms on employment in public 
hospitals. This is what we will evaluate in the next section.  
 
                                                 
6
These three agglomerated multi-site hospitals are the APHP (Assistance Public – Hôpitaux de Paris), APHM 
(Assistance Public – Hôpitaux de Marseille) and HCL (Hospices Civil de Lyon). If we omit the three mega-units, 
average employment in public hospitals falls to a figure of around 660. 
7
This is most flagrant for the largest admissions category, but it also holds in the other size groups. 
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4. Results 
The argument developed in Section 2 above suggested two potential elements affecting 
public hospital employment in the period of our data: i) a break in the correlation between 
local unemployment and hospital employment, due to the reform; and ii) a far less healthy 
labour market following on from the financial crisis (which could produce incentives for local 
job creation that trumped any dampening effect of the health reforms). The overall effect on 
public-hospital employment is then ambiguous and will depend on the relative size of these 
two phenomena. The relationship between hospital employment and local unemployment will 
arguably not be affected by the financial crisis, but will have been by the T2A reform (as 
discussed above). Were public hospital employment to have been too high in efficiency terms 
when the reform was introduced, we expect the competitive reform to yield a smaller or even 
zero correlation between employment and local unemployment in public hospitals. We will 
evaluate this empirically by the estimation of the coefficient on local unemployment in a 
public-hospital employment regression. 
The regressions will also include year dummies. The estimated coefficients on these will 
reveal the time trend in employment in different types of hospitals. This movement over time 
will likely reflect the economic cycle and various reforms, but also other macro factors such 
as hospital technology and aging populations.  
Our first simple regressions analyse the relationship between the log of hospital 
employment, the local unemployment rate, and four year dummies (with the first year, 2006, 
being the omitted category). Unemployment is calculated at the municipality level. As there 
are a few cases with more than one hospital of a given type within the same municipality, the 
standard errors in all regressions are clustered at the municipality level. We run regressions 
separately for each hospital type. These are linear regressions with hospital fixed effects: as 
such, the effect of local unemployment on hospital staff is identified solely by seeing how 
employment within a given hospital changes with the evolution of the local unemployment 
rate. No between-hospital information is used in the estimation of these coefficients. 
We introduce the local unemployment rate in levels, rather than logs. One reason for 
doing so is that the data prefer a log-level to a log-log specification (in the sense that the R
2
 
statistic is higher in the former). A second reason is that using the log of the unemployment 
rate compresses the variation in high-unemployment areas, and it is exactly this variation that 
we wish to exploit. It should be noted that all of our results do continue to hold in log-log 
specifications. We have also checked for the influence of outliers by ensuring that all of the 
14 
 
results below are robust to the omission of the three very large central hospitals in our data 
(and more generally to the omission of research and teaching hospitals).  
The results from these simple regressions appear in Table 2. The local unemployment 
rate is positively correlated with employment in public-sector hospitals. Columns 2 and 3 of 
Table 2 then carry out the same analysis for NFP and private hospitals respectively. Here we 
find no significant employment correlation with the local unemployment rate. The estimated 
coefficient in column 1 predicts that a one percentage-point increase in local unemployment 
will produce a 1.26% rise in employment in public hospitals (since exp(.0125) = 1.026).
8
 
The relationship highlighted in Clark and Milcent (2011) between public-hospital 
employment and local unemployment in cross-section data then continues to hold in panel 
data (i.e. within-hospital), suggesting that the previous cross-section results were not overly-
biased. This interpretation is reinforced by the absence of any unemployment effect on NFP 
employment. NFP hospitals have the same reimbursement rules as do State-owned hospitals, 
but local authorities have no power to determine hospital employment there. Staffing in public 
hospitals can then be viewed as a tool to counter local labour-market difficulties. 
The estimated coefficients on the year dummies are of interest here. These reveal 
continuing employment growth in NFP hospitals, and an essentially flat time profile in private 
hospitals. However, there does seem to be evidence of some kind of break for public 
hospitals, with employment higher in 2007 and 2008 than it was in 2006, but then lower in the 
last two years. This may be thought to be correlated with the complete application of the new 
reimbursement rules in 2008 for public hospitals. 
Table 3 explicitly introduces the date of the reform, by interacting local unemployment 
with two time dummies: one for the period before the reform was fully implemented (2006-
2008), and another for the post-reform period (2009-2010). As the goal of this reform was to 
make public sector and non-public sector hospitals more similar, we might expect the 
coefficient on local unemployment to be reduced after 2008. The question we pose here is 
then whether the reform has managed to break the link between State-owned hospital 
employment and local unemployment: have public hospitals become less Keynesian? 
                                                 
8
As noted in Section 3, there are somewhat more small hospitals in the public sector than in the other sectors. To 
be sure that hospital size was not driving part of the results in Table 2, we split the sample by hospital type into 
large and small groups (as defined by a threshold of 10 000 admissions per year: which is the definition used by 
the French Administration). We find essentially the same positive and significant estimated coefficient on log 
unemployment in large and small public hospitals. Log unemployment remained insignificant in the other four 
regressions. 
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The results show no evidence of such an effect. The role of local unemployment 
continues to hold post-reform with an estimated coefficient that is significant at the 1% level. 
The estimated coefficients on the year dummies in Table 3 are very similar to those in Table 
2. 
One interpretation of this continued relationship is that the link between employment and 
the local labour market in State-owned hospitals is larger in times of high unemployment. As 
a test, we appeal to the cross-section variation in unemployment. We split our sample 
according to whether the local unemployment rate is above or below the median level in our 
sample (which turns out to be 10%
9
), and run panel regressions as in Table 3. The results in 
Table 4 show that for State-owned hospitals in municipalities with below-median 
unemployment, the estimated unemployment coefficient is barely significant pre-reform 
(significant at 13%) and totally insignificant post-reform. Any link between employment and 
the local labour market in public hospitals has then totally disappeared after the reform in 
better-off areas.  
On the contrary, in “high-unemployment” municipalities, the coefficient on 
unemployment is positive and significant for public hospitals both pre- and post-reform (with 
the latter coefficient being a little larger than the former). A plausible interpretation is then 
that public hospital employment is used more intensively as a labour-market policy tool in 
slack labour-market conditions.  
However, this does not mean that the T2A reform ended up having no effect on hospitals. 
In Table 4, as in our other regression tables, the year dummies are significantly negative in 
2009 and 2010 for public-hospital employment, but not for the other hospital types. It is 
tempting to read these as reflecting the reform: faced with greater competition, the trend in 
public hospital employment became negative, even though it continued to react to local 
unemployment. This reform effect (as shown by the year dummies) is far larger in more 
deprived municipalities. 
We next consider Table 3’s specification estimated separately by employee 
qualifications. The link from State-owned hospital employment to local unemployment 
appears for low- to medium-qualified employees in Table 5 (as in Clark and Milcent, 2011). 
Equally, the negative time trend in public hospital employment (conditional on the other 
                                                 
9
Which is not the same as the INSEE national figures that we described above. Hospitals are not randomly-
distributed across the territory, and we do not weight by the size of the commune when we calculate the median. 
The actual value of median unemployment in these municipalities is 9.7%.   
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control variables) only took place for these low- to medium-skill employees. There is no 
evidence of any time trend in the employment of high-skill workers in any type of hospitals. 
Our regressions so far have not included time-varying within-hospital variables. We 
might worry about there being more health demand as local unemployment rise. Table 6 
includes a number of such variables. One of these is the hospital cost weight (as described in 
Section 3), which picks up the different types of patient (in terms of illness gravity) appearing 
in a given hospital in different years. The regressions also control for the percentage of each 
level of illness severity admitted in hospital, the presence of an emergency unit, the number of 
beds (which is quite stable over the period) and the number of patients admitted, the 
percentage of day-surgery and the percentage of sessions (such as chemotherapy-sessions, for 
instance). The local demand for health is picked up by the municipality fixed effects, which 
are multicollinear with the hospital fixed effects. The standard errors continue to be clustered 
at the municipality level. 
Table 6 displays the results after controlling for time-varying within-hospital variables. 
The results here can be compared to those in Table 3, which does not include these variables. 
There continues to be a significant effect of local unemployment on public hospital 
employment in Table 6. For NFP hospitals, which are reimbursed like public hospitals, there 
remains no effect, as is the case also for FP hospitals. The employment trend for State-owned 
hospitals is still negative, with no trend for the other hospital types. NFP and FP hospitals are 
then similar in terms of employment trend and there being no employment correlation with 
the local unemployment rate. On the contrary, the reform does seem to have changed the 
employment behaviour of State-owned hospitals, with a clear fall in employment post-reform. 
However, in the context of the financial crisis, we find no evidence that the T2A reform has 
changed employment behaviour with respect to local unemployment. The answer to the 
question of whether the reform has managed to break the link between public-hospital 
employment and local unemployment is “No, but”. The reform does seem to have reduced 
public-hospital employment, but has not touched its local cyclical nature. 
 
5. Conclusions 
We have here used five years of panel data on the universe of French hospitals to 
evaluate the effect of pro-competitive reforms regarding  hospital reimbursement. We ask first 
whether these reforms changed hospital employment, and then whether they affected the 
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relationship between hospital employment and local unemployment previously observed in 
public-sector hospitals. 
In the first sense, the DRG-basis payment reform to the French hospital system 
“worked”. The downward post-reform employment trend we find in State-owned hospitals is 
not observed in other hospital types (NFP hospitals and FP hospitals): different hospital types 
have converged in an employment sense. 
However, if this reform was meant to have blurred, or even removed, the distinction 
between the health and large local employer roles of public hospitals, then it seems to have 
failed. Public hospitals show no sign of reacting less to local unemployment after the 
introduction of the reform. The fact that this continuing relationship is only found in higher 
unemployment areas suggests that in times of labour-market crisis, local politicians are able to 
continue to exert pressure on the hiring behaviour in public hospitals. In this context, it will be 
of interest to see whether the HPST reform that started in 2010, which aimed to dilute the 
power of local politicians in hospital management, affects the way in which hospitals react to 
local unemployment. 
Much has been made of the comparison of the efficiency of different sectors of the 
economy: Is the private sector a more efficient provider of some goods and services than the 
public sector? The first difficulty in making such comparisons is the measurement of output, 
as the public sector is often present in areas where the measurement of output or value-added 
is not obvious. This is for example the case in education (where it is not a paper certificate or 
simple years spent in school) and health (which is not only being alive on discharge, but a 
more general measure of quality of life following treatment). 
The second issue is that of standardising the inputs that are used to determine the output. 
One key question here concerns selection. Private schools may obtain better education 
outcomes, but they do not admit the same pupils as State schools, making it hard to carry out 
the comparison of like with like. Equally, in the domain examined here, it is easy to imagine 
that some health providers will cherry pick their patients, leaving those who are deemed to be 
difficult or expensive to treat to the residual health claimant: public-sector hospitals.  
The third point, which is at the heart of what we have discussed here, concerns the 
perhaps intractable question of what is meant by efficiency in a social-welfare sense. What is 
it, as a society, that we would want hospitals or schools to do? A purely health-provision point 
of view is that hospitals should be efficient, in the sense of producing the best-quality 
healthcare for a given set of inputs.  
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However, hospitals do not operate in a vacuum, and other prerogatives may come into 
play. In particular, one of the main inputs that hospitals use is labour, and society may have 
preferences over the level of unemployment. A hospital can reduce local unemployment by 
hiring more staff, producing a positive societal externality. Our main point here is that those 
who manage public hospitals may well internalise this externality more than will those who 
manage private hospitals. We therefore expect public hospitals to hire more staff in response 
to higher unemployment than private hospitals. 
We can have diverse beliefs about whether this hiring difference is valuable. One point of 
view is that the public sector by doing so spends public money to create little in terms of extra 
output, and crucially little in terms of lower unemployment (as it crowds out the private 
sector). Towards the other end of the spectrum, we may consider that the negative 
externalities from unemployment (and therefore the positive externalities from employment) 
are of considerable magnitude, and we may also think that extra staff produce noticeably 
better healthcare (which, as noted above, is notoriously difficult to measure). This is therefore 
a Keynesian employment policy, but one which produces a far more socially-valuable output 
than digging holes. 
An additional point to be considered in this respect is the type of job and contract that 
public-sector hospitals use to increase employment. Private-sector firms can flexibly hire and 
fire workers with long-term contracts; however, public-sector hospital employment flexibility 
is achieved via different types of short-term contract. One potential drawback is that little 
human capital is created in these short-term positions, with potential knock-on effects on 
hospital efficiency. 
We cannot settle this argument here. The private sector may well produce the same 
output with less employment. But the greater employment in the public sector may also yield 
positive societal spillovers. Those who decide on the level of employment in private hospitals 
have less incentive to take this externality into account. Competition here may then run the 
risk of increasing productive efficiency but reducing social welfare. 
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Figure 1. Timeline of Reforms and Data 
 
 
Notes: In the top panel, the bold figure refers to the percentage of budget reimbursed 
according to payment-per-service in public and NFP hospitals, and the italic figure to the 
same percentage in private hospitals. The red period on the time line corresponds to our data.  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Number of employees by year and hospital type 
 
Note: Number of employees measured in FTEs. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Hospital 
type 
No. of hospitals (mean per 
year), rounded 
Std. 
Dev. 
No. of 
employees 
(mean) 
Std. 
Dev. 
Minimum Maximum 
Public 886 21.4 754.1 2829.0 16.1 76527.1 
NFP 181 3.7 287.0 303.0 8.3 1868.6 
Private 628 21.5 161.0 142.6 6.7 1712.5 
Note: Data from the DREES (Ministry of Health). 2006-2010 (5 waves) 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Log employment and local unemployment: Panel results 
 
 Public NFP Private 
Unemployment rate (%) 0.0125*** 0.00475 0.00175 
 (0.00353) (0.00498) (0.00359) 
2007 0.0325*** 0.0257** 0.0152 
 (0.00847) (0.0126) (0.0106) 
2008 0.0254*** 0.0370*** 0.0108 
 (0.00794) (0.0117) (0.00930) 
2009 -0.0533*** 0.0483*** 0.0178* 
 (0.0108) (0.0148) (0.0102) 
2010 -0.0642*** 0.0656*** 0.0171 
 (0.0121) (0.0178) (0.0129) 
Constant 6.091*** 5.000*** 1.492*** 
 (0.0200) (0.0400) (0.0743) 
Observations 4427 906 3,137 
Number of hospitals 928 208 716 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The regressions include hospital fixed-effects  
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Table 3. Log employment and local unemployment: pre- and post-reform 
 
 
Public NFP Private 
Unemployment rate (%) prior to the 
reform (2008) 
0.00654* 0.00811 -0.000165 
(0.00383) (0.00573) (0.00421) 
Unemployment rate (%) after the 
reform (2008) 
0.0115*** 0.00588 0.000923 
(0.00349) (0.00496) (0.00367) 
2007 
0.0271*** 0.0287** 0.0132 
(0.00837) (0.0134) (0.0105) 
2008 
-0.0218 0.0584** -0.000473 
(0.0161) (0.0275) (0.0157) 
2009 
-0.0991*** 0.0677** 0.00787 
(0.0178) (0.0271) (0.0150) 
2010 
-0.110*** 0.0846*** 0.00749 
(0.0188) (0.0292) (0.0165) 
Constant 
6.132*** 4.973*** 1.503*** 
(0.0249) (0.0477) (0.0777) 
    Observations 4420 905 3,136 
Number of hospitals 928 208 716 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The regressions include hospital fixed-effects  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Log employment and local unemployment: above and below median 
unemployment municipalities 
 
 Local unemployment: Below median Local unemployment: Above median 
 
Public NFP Private Public NFP Private 
Unemployment rate (%) 
prior to the reform 
(2008) 
0.00625 0.0127 0.00389 0.0127** 0.00587 0.00105 
(0.00417) (0.0155) (0.00734) (0.00602) (0.00895) (0.00630) 
Unemployment rate (%) 
after the reform (2008) 
0.000282 0.0150 -0.00202 0.0169*** -0.00418 0.00273 
(0.00814) (0.0138) (0.00753) (0.00528) (0.00769) (0.00533) 
2007 
0.0188 0.0353 0.0180 0.0280** 0.0239 0.0201 
(0.0114) (0.0223) (0.0123) (0.0141) (0.0170) (0.0200) 
2008 
-0.0222 0.0170 0.0489 -0.0190 0.162*** -0.00755 
(0.0403) (0.0517) (0.0315) (0.0357) (0.0567) (0.0385) 
2009 
-0.107** 0.0382 0.0528 -0.0823** 0.177*** 0.00592 
(0.0440) (0.0500) (0.0339) (0.0364) (0.0579) (0.0368) 
2010 
-0.127*** 0.0280 0.0688** -0.0923** 0.213*** -0.00394 
(0.0452) (0.0518) (0.0344) (0.0368) (0.0595) (0.0397) 
Constant 
6.194*** 4.937*** 1.475*** 6.015*** 5.961*** 5.459*** 
(0.0450) (0.118) (0.0817) (0.0769) (0.0957) (0.0687) 
 
      
Observations 2,346 444 1,440 2,074 461 1,696 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The regressions include hospital fixed-effects. The median 
unemployment rate across municipalities is 9.73%.   
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Table 5. Log employment and local unemployment: level of employee qualification 
 Very low-qualified Low-qualified 
 
Public NFP Private Public NFP Private 
Unemployment rate (%) 
prior to the reform 
(2008) 
0.114*** 0.0313* -0.00613 0.0961*** 0.00769 0.00390 
(0.0114) (0.0165) (0.00693) (0.00813) (0.0147) (0.00679) 
Unemployment rate (%) 
after the reform (2008) 
0.119*** 0.0123 -0.00121 0.0973*** -0.00981 0.00573 
(0.00777) (0.0118) (0.00520) (0.00583) (0.00999) (0.00536) 
2007 
0.152** 0.0794 0.0427 0.0957* 0.0359 0.0323 
(0.0766) (0.138) (0.0550) (0.0580) (0.115) (0.0558) 
2008 
0.0832 0.253 0.0243 0.0347 0.221 0.0164 
(0.146) (0.251) (0.105) (0.107) (0.211) (0.108) 
2009 
-0.0930 0.267 0.0624 -0.140 0.250 0.0206 
(0.152) (0.262) (0.111) (0.113) (0.218) (0.114) 
2010 
-0.103 0.340 0.0799 -0.0390** 0.310 0.00931 
(0.154) (0.262) (0.113) (0.0176) (0.219) (0.118) 
 Medium-qualified High-qualified 
 
Public NFP Private Public NFP Private 
Unemployment rate (%) 
prior to the reform 
(2008) 
0.0788*** 0.0252 0.00755 0.000368 0.0269*** 0.00791** 
(0.00912) (0.0166) (0.00609) (0.00283) (0.00896) (0.00309) 
Unemployment rate (%) 
after the reform (2008) 
0.0772*** 0.00970 0.00548 0.00139 0.0214*** 0.0110*** 
(0.00642) (0.0117) (0.00415) (0.00189) (0.00632) (0.00200) 
2007 
0.120* 0.0408 0.0432 -0.0109 -0.0373 -0.161 
(0.0652) (0.147) (0.0425) (0.0182) (0.0648) (0.114) 
2008 
0.0867 0.194 0.0399 5.34e-05 -0.0754 -0.00693 
(0.120) (0.255) (0.0840) (0.0388) (0.127) (0.0397) 
2009 
-0.106* 0.205 0.0897 0.250 -0.0268 -0.0259 
(0.0589) (0.264) (0.0870) (0.262) (0.127) (0.0418) 
2010 
-0.143*** 0.137*** 0.0722 0.0698 -0.00412 -0.0479 
(0.041) (0.0400) (0.0890) (0.127) (0.128) (0.0466) 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The regressions include hospital fixed-effects. The very 
low qualified are low-skilled manual workers; low-qualified includes some administrative and medical support staff; medium 
qualified includes Nurses and higher-level administrative staff; and high-qualified covers Doctors and midwives. Self-employed 
Doctors are assumed to count for 50% of a full-time equivalent 
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Table 6. Log employment and local unemployment: adding control variables 
VARIABLES Public NFP Private 
Unemployment rate (%) prior to the 
reform (2008) 
0.0120*** 0.0024 0.000669 
(0.00350) (0.00955) (0.00482) 
Unemployment rate (%) from the reform 
(2008) 
0.0138*** 0.00202 0.00240 
(0.00315) (0.00638) (0.00423) 
2007 
0.0265*** 0.0248* 0.0203** 
(0.00834) (0.0134) (0.00957) 
2008 
0.000103 0.0389 0.00461 
(0.0149) (0.0264) (0.0176) 
2009 
-0.0660*** 0.0250 0.00796 
(0.0158) (0.0272) (0.0173) 
2010 
-0.0707*** 0.0276 0.00421 
(0.0166) (0.0286) (0.0180) 
Log Number of Beds 
0.0570*** 0.155*** 0.113*** 
(0.0189) (0.0333) (0.0141) 
Log Admissions 
0.0518*** 0.0380*** 0.0144*** 
(0.0191) (0.0114) (0.00517) 
% Low severity REF REF REF 
% Moderate severity 
0.0676 -0.231 -0.183 
(0.103) (0.210) (0.213) 
% Severe severity 
0.195 0.369* 0.783** 
(0.119) (0.219) (0.375) 
% Acute severity 
0.772*** -1.003 -0.257 
(0.295) (0.657) (1.270) 
Emergency Unit 
-0.0712 0.0311 -0.00851 
(0.0444) (0.0608) (0.0367) 
% Day-surgery 
0.1065*** -0.00123 -0.305*** 
(0.0291) (0.254) (0.111) 
% of Sessions 
0.162 0.0244 0.00376 
(0.118) (0.127) (0.124) 
Cost Weight 
2.47e-09*** 1.12e-08*** 7.31e-09*** 
(8.06e-10) (3.87e-09) (2.76e-09) 
Constant 
5.842*** 4.046*** 1.652*** 
(0.192) (0.228) (0.205) 
 
   Observations 3,238 619 2,882 
Number of hospitals 714 147 643 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The regressions include hospital fixed-effects  
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Appendix Table A1 
 
No. Of observations Mean Std. Dev. 
No. Employees 8470 484.5 2069.03 
No. Nurses 8470 261.4 1120.84 
No. Support staff 8470 105.5 384.89 
No. Administrative staff 8470 75.1 326.16 
No. Paramedical staff 8470 42.5 244.67 
No. of Beds 8470 131.9 390.72 
 
8470 (median: 62) 
No. of Admissions 8470 7275.5 18967.77 
% Illness: low Severity 8470 69.9% 0.11 
% Illness: moderate Severity 8470 19.1% 0.10 
% Illness: high Severity 8470 9.0% 0.09 
% Illness: very high Severity 8470 2.1% 0.02 
Emergency 8470 27.3% 0.45 
Cost Weight 6780 1.56E+07 4.21E+07 
Local Unemployment Rate (/100) 8461 10.3 4.26 
Median Municipality Income 8470 14268.0 3176.86 
Municipality Death Rate (/100) 8470 1.1% 0.01 
Local % Foreign-Born (/100) 8470 6.4% 0.04 
Local % Aged 60-74 (/100) 8470 14.1% 0.03 
Local % Aged 75+ (/100) 8470 9.5% 0.04 
Note: The last six lines in this table refer to the unweighted average figures across municipalities in which there is a hospital.  
 
Appendix Table A2. Hospital numbers by year and hospital type 
Hospitals 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total 
Public 909 906 889 871 852 4427 
NFP 187 182 182 179 176 906 
For-Profit 663 638 623 607 606 3137 
Total 1759 1726 1694 1657 1634 8470 
 
Appendix Table A3. Employment staff and hospital type (2006-2010 average) 
 
Public NFP Private 
< 5000 Admissions 
131.2 135.2 85.5 
N=557 N=113 N=377 
5000-10 000 Admissions 
501.4 383.4 211.5 
N=90.6 N=41 N=165 
10 000-16 000 Admissions 
790.1 693.0 371.3 
N=74 N=21 N=65 
> 16 000 Admissions 
2984.3 1030.1 472.8 
N=165 N=6 N=21 
 
